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ATTORNEYS BEWARE: JERMAN V. CARLISLE
HOLDS YOU LIABLE FOR TECHNICAL
LEGAL ERRORS UNDER THE FDCPA
Vartan S. Madoyan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices have
long been a problem for consumers in our society.1 The need for
protection from such practices is particularly high when third-party
companies engage in debt collection. Unlike creditors, who are
generally restrained by a desire to protect their reputation and
goodwill with consumers whom they hope to later transact with,
“independent collectors are likely to have no future contact with the
consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer’s opinion of
them.”2 As a result of this dynamic, Congress enacted the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA or “Act”) in 1977 to better regulate
third-party debt collectors.3
While the FDCPA did not originally apply to attorneys,4 in
1995, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 1986 amendment to the
Act (“1986 Amendment”) brought attorneys firmly within the Act’s
reach.5 Because the FDCPA imposes strict liability for certain
* J.D. 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Economics, 2007, University of
California, San Diego. I want to thank Professor Lauren E. Willis for her thoughtful guidance and
advice throughout this Comment, for without her, this would not have been possible. I also want
to thank the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all of their hard work
and effort in putting together this inaugural Supreme Court issue. And finally, I want to thank my
friends and family for the continual support they have provided me along the way.
1. See S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1695–96;
see also Penney on Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1985, at C15 (describing the J.C. Penney
Company’s debt collectors’ harassment of some of the company’s customers more than twentyfive years ago).
2. S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 2.
3. States may also supplement the FDCPA by providing further protection. Id.
4. See Christian Stueben, Note, Judge or Jury? Determining Deception or
Misrepresentation Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3107,
3119–21 (2010).
5. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292, 299 (1995).
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technical legal errors,6 creditors’ attorneys may feel forced to hesitate
before advocating strongly for their clients’ legal positions, lest they
risk their own personal liability. Although the FDCPA includes a
“bona fide error” exception that excuses unintentional violations that
occur despite procedures put in place to avoid such errors,7 circuit
courts were split as to whether technical legal errors could qualify as
bona fide errors under the Act.8 If they could not, then attorneys
would be subject to strict liability (and potentially large monetary
liability) under the FDCPA for otherwise honest errors. As a result,
attorneys may strongly hesitate before advocating zealously for their
clients.
The Supreme Court resolved this circuit court split in 2010 in
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA,9 by
reversing the Sixth Circuit’s prior decision in the case and holding
that the bona fide error exception does not apply to technical (or
nontechnical) legal errors.10 Although the Court’s decision was based
in part on statutory construction and legislative history, a majority of
the Court concluded that its decision would not place “unmanageable
burdens on lawyers practicing in the debt collection industry.”11 The
dissent, however, expressed fear that as plaintiffs file more frivolous
lawsuits in hopes of persuading defendants to settle,12 the majority’s
decision could turn a segment of the legal system on its head by
encouraging creditors’ attorneys to “adopt a debtor-friendly
interpretation of every question.”13
Although it is too soon to say which of these opinions will be
borne out empirically, this Comment takes seriously the dissent’s
6. See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1634–35
(2010) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2002);
see also Darren W. Ford, Comment, Secondary Liability Under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (2010) (“[T]he majority of the Act’s provisions
impose strict liability on debt collectors.”).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006).
8. Compare Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 476
(6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010) (mistakes of law may qualify), and Johnson, 305
F.3d at 1122–24 (same), with Hulshizer v. Global Credit Servs., Inc., 728 F.2d 1037, 1038 (8th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (bona fide error defense unavailing), and Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677
F.2d 775, 779–80 (9th Cir. 1982) (same).
9. 130 S. Ct. 1605.
10. Id. at 1608, 1610–11.
11. Id. at 1624.
12. Id. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 1634.
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concerns. Part II discusses the FDCPA’s statutory background and
the factual background that led to the Court’s decision in Jerman.
Part III describes the Court’s reasoning in holding that the bona fide
error exception does not apply to mistakes of law. Part IV analyzes
the potential conflict that forces attorneys to choose between zealous
advocacy for their own clients and personal liability under the Act.
Finally, Part V concludes that Congress should monitor the situation
and amend the statute should this conflict prove irreconcilable.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statutory Background
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1977 to protect consumers by
curbing “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” by
third parties who regularly collect debt for others.14 In addition to the
FDCPA’s consumer-protection goals, Congress sought, by enacting
the FDCPA, to ensure that those debt collectors who abstained from
such abusive practices were not competitively disadvantaged in the
marketplace.15 A violation of the FDCPA, whether enforced
administratively by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or
judicially through civil lawsuits, is therefore accompanied by varying
and drastic financial implications.16 In fact, in addition to actual and
statutory damages, the Act entitles successful civil plaintiffs to costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees.17
14. Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006)).
15. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1608.
16. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k–1692l. In administrative actions, for example, debt collectors
are subject to penalties of up to $16,000 per day if found to have acted with “actual knowledge or
knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances that [their actions were] unfair
or deceptive and [were] prohibited [by the FDCPA].” Id. § 45(m)(1)(A)–(C); see also Federal
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, 16 C.F.R. § 1.98(d) (2010) (adjusting the
maximum civil penalties to $16,000). In civil cases, in addition to actual damages, courts may
award individual plaintiffs statutory damages up to $1,000, or, in class actions, award up to “the
lesser of $500,000 or 1 [percent] of the net worth of the debt collector.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1), (3). Reasonable attorney’s fees are generally deemed
mandatory in a successful case, regardless of the violation committed or the damages suffered.
See Zagorski v. Midwest Billing Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing
lower court’s decision to reject reasonable attorney’s fees for defendants’ de minimis violation);
Carroll v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 53 F.3d 626, 628–29 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding reasonable
attorney’s fees mandatory absent unusual circumstances, such as bad faith conduct); Graziano v.
Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 114 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport,
Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding plaintiff was owed attorney’s fees unless defendant
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Among other prohibitions, the FDCPA bars debt collectors from
“making false representations as to a debt’s character, amount, or
legal status; communicating with consumers at an ‘unusual time or
place’ likely to be inconvenient to the consumer; or using obscene or
profane language or violence or the threat thereof.”18 The FDCPA
also contains specific notice provisions that debt collectors must
affirmatively follow. With certain exceptions not pertinent here, 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(a) provides that a debt collector must, within five
days of its initial communication with a consumer, send the
consumer a written notice containing “a statement that unless the
consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the
validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed
to be valid by the debt collector.”19 Although courts are split as to
whether a consumer must specifically dispute the debt in writing to
avoid this assumption,20 a written notification, if sent within the
thirty-day period, will require a debt collector to cease debtcollection activities until providing the debt verification or creditor
information requested.21
The Supreme Court has fundamentally characterized a violation
of any of these provisions as a technical legal error, subjecting
attorney debt collectors and their law firms to civil liability if the
violations were committed during the course of their representation
of a client.22 The FDCPA contains two exceptions, however, to the
imposition of legal liability. The first exception, and the one most
relevant to this Comment, provides:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action
brought under [the FDCPA] if the debt collector shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not
intentional and resulted from a bona fide error

could assert a successful § 1692k(c) defense on remand). But see Johnson v. Eaton, 80 F.3d 148,
151–52 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying attorney’s fees because plaintiff suffered no actual damages).
18. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1608–09 (citations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c–1692e).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
20. Compare Graziano, 950 F.2d at 112 (finding that the lower court did not err in
determining that only disputes made in writing were effective under the statute), with Camacho v.
Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1080–82 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the statute does not
require disputes to be made in writing).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
22. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 298–99 (1995); Stueben, supra note 4, at 3117–18.
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notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
adapted to avoid any such error.23
The second exception requires defendants to act in good faith and “in
conformity with any advisory opinion of the [FTC].”24 However, the
FTC has rarely issued such advisory opinions.25
B. Factual Background
In April 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., represented by
respondents Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich Co., LPA,
and Adrienne S. Foster (“Foster”), one of the law firm’s attorneys
(collectively, “Carlisle” or “law firm”), filed a foreclosure action in
an Ohio state court against petitioner Karen L. Jerman (“Jerman”),
after one of Carlisle’s representatives called Jerman to verify her
address and phone number.26 The summons and complaint served on
Jerman included a notice stating that the “mortgage debt would be
assumed to be valid unless Jerman disputed it in writing.”27 In
response, Jerman’s attorney sent a letter to Foster stating that Jerman
had paid the debt in full in January 2006 and that Jerman therefore
disputed and sought to verify the alleged debt owed.28 After Foster
verified with Countrywide that the debt was, in fact, paid in full,
Foster quickly withdrew Countrywide’s foreclosure suit.29
Jerman then filed a class action lawsuit against Carlisle in an
Ohio district court contending that Carlisle had violated 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g by stating in the notice that Jerman’s debt would be assumed
valid unless disputed in writing.30 Although § 1692g requires debt
collectors to give consumers such notices, it does not specifically

23. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
24. Id. § 1692k(e).
25. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1621 (2010)
(noting that in the preceding decade, the FTC has issued only four opinions—in response to seven
requests—with a typical response time of three to four months).
26. Id. at 1609; Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3–4, Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 502 F. Supp. 2d 686
(N.D. Ohio 2007) (No. 1:06 CV 1397).
27. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609 (emphasis added).
28. Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
supra note 26, at 3–4.
29. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609.
30. Id.
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require a consumer to dispute the debt in writing.31 Jerman sued on
this basis and, although she did not claim to have suffered harm as a
result of Carlisle’s actions, sought class certification, actual damages,
and statutory damages equal to the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of
Carlisle’s net worth, plus attorney’s fees and costs.32 To assist her in
calculating Carlisle’s net worth, during discovery Jerman “sought
information from [Carlisle] concerning the income and net worth of
each partner in the firm.”33
Jerman later proposed to settle the case if Carlisle paid her
$15,000 in damages and $7,500 in attorney’s fees.34 After settlement
talks failed, the trial court granted summary judgment for Carlisle.35
Despite the “division of authority on the question,” the trial court
agreed with Jerman that Carlisle had violated § 1692g by including
the “in writing” requirement in the notice.36 Nevertheless, the court
ruled in Carlisle’s favor because it concluded that § 1692k(c)
“shielded [the law firm] from liability because the violation was not
intentional, resulted from a bona fide error, and occurred despite the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error.”37 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the bona
fide error exception shielded Carlisle from liability for its technical
legal error.38 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
circuit split as to whether the bona fide error exception extended to
mistakes of law.39

31. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) (2006); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
Ulrich LPA, 464 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
32. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Amended Class Action
Complaint: Unfair Debt Collection Practices at 4, Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d 720 (No. 1:06-CV01397), 2007 WL 681482).
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing to the record).
35. See Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
36. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1609–10 (citing Jerman, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 722–25).
37. Id. at 1610 (citing Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 502 F.
Supp. 2d 686, 695–97 (N.D. Ohio 2007)).
38. See id. (citing Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469,
473–76 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1605).
39. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Courts are also split as to whether consumers
are required to dispute debts in writing. See supra note 20. Because this issue was not raised on
appeal, however, the Court expressed no view on the matter. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1610 & n.3.
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III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Construction of Statutory Language
The majority began by reiterating the “common maxim, familiar
to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person,
either civilly or criminally.”40 It is likely for this reason, the majority
opined, that “when Congress has intended to provide a mistake-oflaw defense to civil liability, it has often done so more explicitly than
here.”41
One such example is evident in the administrative penalty
provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which
Congress incorporated into the FDCPA.42 The FTC Act explicitly
holds debt collectors liable only when acting with “actual knowledge
or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances”
that their actions were unlawful.43 Given the absence of similar
language in the FDCPA’s bona fide error provision, the majority
concluded:
[I]t is a fair inference that Congress chose to permit injured
consumers to recover . . . for ‘intentional’ conduct,
including violations resulting from [a] mistaken
interpretation of the FDCPA, while reserving the more
onerous penalties of the FTC Act for debt collectors whose
intentional actions also reflected . . . [knowledge] that the
conduct was prohibited.44
The majority also noted that Congress did not confine liability
under the FDCPA to only “‘willful’ violations, a term more often
understood in the civil context to excuse mistakes of law.”45 It
observed that even in the criminal context, references to “a
‘knowing’ or ‘intentional’ ‘violation’ . . . has not necessarily implied
a defense for legal errors.”46 The majority drew additional support for
its finding from § 1692k(c)’s requirement that a debt collector
40. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1611 (quoting Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 404, 411
(1833)).
41. Id. at 1612.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A), (C) (2006)).
44. Id. For the dissent’s countervailing view, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
45. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1613.
46. Id. (citations omitted).
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maintain “procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”47
Since the term “procedure” is defined as “a series of steps followed
in a regular orderly definite way,” the majority reasoned that the
FDCPA is more naturally interpreted as applying to mechanical,
clerical, or factual errors, rather than legal errors, which can be more
complex in nature.48
Finally, the majority rejected Carlisle’s reliance on Heintz v.
Jenkins.49 In Heintz, the Court first held that the 1986 Amendment
meant that the Act’s definition of “debt collector” now included
attorneys who regularly (even through litigation) attempt to collect
consumer debts.50 In addition, the Heintz Court held that § 1692e(5)
of the FDCPA—the provision prohibiting debt collectors from
making any “threat to take action that cannot legally be taken”—
would not necessarily render an attorney liable for filing an
unsuccessful claim against a debtor, rejecting the argument that such
a scenario would involve an attorney taking an action void of legal
support.51 The Heintz Court was skeptical that § 1692e(5) itself
demanded such a result, but assuming it did, the decision suggested
that an attorney’s potential liability was not “so absurd” or disruptive
to the legal system as to warrant implying a categorical exemption
because the bona fide error defense could save an attorney from such
potential liability.52 In the instant case, the majority stated that
Carlisle’s reliance on Heintz was unavailing because Heintz implied
that, at most, attorneys could only invoke the FDCPA’s bona fide
error defense for factual errors, not mistakes of law (such as a
misinterpretation of the FDCPA’s requirements).53
The dissent in Jerman, on the other hand, concluded very
differently on many of these points. The dissent reasoned that in the
civil context, the word “willful,” as opposed to the word
“intentional,” has been used to impose a lower—not higher—
threshold for liability because even reckless acts have been deemed
47. Id. at 1614.
48. Id. at 1614–15 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1807
(1976)).
49. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
50. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1618 (citing Heintz, 514 U.S. at 292).
51. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (1988)).
52. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1618 (citing Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295).
53. See id. at 1618–19.
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“willful.”54 Moreover, it surmised that even if the majority’s
proffered distinction between “intentional” and “willful” exists, the
Court’s precedent has specifically tailored such a distinction to the
criminal context—not to civil cases.55
The dissent also placed great weight on Congress’s use of the
word “violation” in § 1692k(c).56 Under the dissent’s theory, the
FDCPA’s juxtaposition of language denoting the mens rea
requirement (in other words, its use of the word “intentional”) with
the word “violation” created a mistake-of-law defense because a
“violation” alludes to the notion of a legal infraction.57 The dissent
therefore reasoned that, while the general maxim that ignorance of
the law is no excuse remains true, the Act provided an express
exception to this general prohibition.58
Finally, the dissent stated that Heintz provided a further reason
to interpret § 1692k(c) to include good faith legal errors.59 The
dissent was troubled that the majority’s decision in Jerman
undermined Heintz by concluding that “[a]ttorneys may now be held
liable for taking reasonable legal positions in good faith if those
positions are ultimately rejected.”60 In order to prevent such a result,
the dissent read the FDCPA to provide the following statutory
scheme:
(1) intentional violations are punishable under the
heightened penalties of the FTC Act; (2) unintentional
violations are generally subject to punishment under the
FDCPA; and (3) a defendant may escape liability altogether
by proving that a violation [including a mistake of law] was
based on a bona fide error and that reasonable errorprevention procedures were in place.61
54. Id. at 1630 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Thus, “[a]voiding liability under a statute aimed at
intentional violations should . . . be easier . . . than avoiding liability under a statute aimed at
willful violations.” Id.
55. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007)).
56. Id. at 1629.
57. Id. at 1629–30 (“The FDCPA’s use of [the word] ‘violation’ thus distinguishes it from
most of the authorities relied upon by the [majority] to demonstrate that mistake-of-law defenses
are disfavored.”).
58. Id. at 1636.
59. See id. at 1633.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1637.
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B. Legislative History
While the majority and dissent each purported to find sufficient
support for their positions from their differing interpretations of the
statutory text, they each analyzed the FDCPA’s legislative history in
an attempt to bolster their respective positions. Carlisle too, in
advancing its position that mistakes of law were bona fide errors
under the FDCPA, relied on legislative history in the form of a
Senate Committee Report stating that “[a] debt collector has no
liability . . . if he violates the [A]ct in any manner, including with
regard to the [A]ct’s coverage, when such violation is unintentional
and occurred despite procedures designed to avoid such violations.”62
Carlisle asserted that because a mistake “with regard to the [A]ct’s
coverage” would be a mistake of law, Congress intended the bona
fide error defense to apply to such mistakes.63 The majority rejected
this argument, however, stating that such a reading could have
contemplated mistakes of fact affecting the Act’s coverage, not
mistakes of law, particularly because the FDCPA did not originally
apply to attorneys.64
The majority, however, generally found the legislative record
vague and uncertain when viewed in its entirety.65 On one hand, a
Senate Banking Committee member who was a primary sponsor of
the Act stated his view that “certain things ought not to happen,
period,” implying a more limited bona fide error exception.66 On the
other hand, a chairman in a legislative markup session confirmed
from a staffer that the defense did not simply concern mathematical
errors, but applied to “any violation of the act which was
unintentional,” including “technical error[s].”67 Due to this
uncertainty, the majority declined to give controlling weight to the
legislative history.68
Despite declaring that it would not give controlling weight to it,
the majority looked to additional areas of legislative history and
62. Id. at 1619 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977),
reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1699–700).
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1619 n.14.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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believed that any remaining doubt about the proper interpretation of
§ 1692k(c) was “dispelled by evidence of the meaning attached to
the language Congress copied into the FDCPA’s bona fide error
defense.”69 The bona fide error defense in TILA was copied
verbatim, nine years later, into the FDCPA.70 During the nine-year
period between TILA’s enactment and the FDCPA’s passage, the
three circuit courts to consider the question (the Second, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits) interpreted TILA’s bona fide error defense as
referring to only clerical errors.71 According to the majority,
“repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates . . .
[congressional] intent to incorporate its . . . [well-settled] judicial
interpretations . . . .”72 While the majority acknowledged that
interpretations by three circuit courts may not have “settled” the
meaning of TILA’s bona fide error defense, it nevertheless
concluded that there was no reason to suppose Congress disagreed
with those interpretations when enacting the FDCPA.73 Thus, the
majority found it reasonable to infer that, based on these three
holdings, Congress understood the statutory formula it chose for the
FDCPA.74
The dissent attacked the majority’s assertion that the bona fide
error defense’s language was well settled. It avowed that, given that
this assumption was based on three appellate decisions, “which are
contradicted by several District Court opinions and a State Supreme
Court opinion[, this is] hardly a consistent legal backdrop against
which to divine legislative intent.”75 While damages for technical
69. Id. at 1615.
70. Id. at 1615–16.
71. Id. at 1616 & n.10.
72. Id. at 1616 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)).
73. Id. However, as previously stated, other circuit courts have since held differently. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1122–24 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding bona fide error
provision applies to mistakes of law).
74. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1616 & n.11.
75. Id. at 1639 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion went even
further in attacking the majority’s assertion that TILA’s history can provide some guidance in
interpreting the FDCPA. According to Justice Scalia, it is “legal fiction” to assume that Congress
understood the judicial interpretation of the bona fide error language based on merely three
appellate decisions. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Although noting that the majority discounted what seemed to him as the most persuasive piece of
legislative history (the “with regard to the Act’s coverage” debate), Scalia concluded that no
weight should be given to the legislative record as it invariably disrupts the more appropriate
textual analysis. Id. at 1625–28.

1102

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1091

violations may be small, the dissent opined that the pressure to settle
such cases to avoid litigation costs can be quite high.76 Moreover, the
FDCPA requires courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to any
successful plaintiff regardless of the extent of the damages.77 As a
result, attorneys acting in good faith but making technical legal
errors under the Act are unfairly disadvantaged.78
C. Policy Concerns
As applied to an attorney’s technical legal error, the FDCPA has
the potential to distort our legal system—a system based on zealous
advocacy. The majority, however, found no such grave consequences
from its reading of the Act’s bona fide error defense, focusing
instead on other FDCPA provisions that could potentially curb such
absurd results: (1) when an alleged violation is trivial, actual
damages will likely be de minimis; (2) the FDCPA places a cap on
statutory damages and vests courts with discretion to adjust such
damages; and (3) although the FDCPA contemplates an award of
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, courts have discretion in
calculating what is reasonable, and “§ 1692k(a)(3) authorizes courts
to award attorney’s fees to the defendant if a plaintiff’s suit ‘was
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.’”79 The
majority also observed that attorneys could avoid liability by
obtaining advisory opinions from the FTC under § 1692k(e) but did
not place significant weight on such a remedy because of the FTC’s
impractical response time and, its frequent penchant for declining to
even issue an opinion.80
Finally, the majority surmised that an attorney’s interest in
avoiding FDCPA liability will not always be adverse to his or her
client’s interest, as some courts have held clients vicariously liable
for their attorneys’ FDCPA violations.81 The majority also stated
76. Id. at 1632–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1620–21 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1)–(3)
(2006)).
80. Id. at 1621. Justice Breyer placed a greater burden on the FTC to more readily issue
advisory opinions; because he assumed the FTC would do so in the future, Breyer concurred with
the majority. Id. at 1625 (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 1622 (majority opinion) (citing Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507,
1516 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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that, to the extent the FDCPA constrains an attorney’s advocacy on
behalf of a client, such constraints are not new since attorneys are
subject to judicial sanctions for harassment and improper actions
during litigation and also must generally comply with standards of
professional conduct.82
In sum, the majority predicted that its decision would not
unnecessarily burden attorney debt collectors.83 Absent a showing
that “‘the result [would be] so absurd as to warrant’ disregarding the
weight of textual authority,” the majority held that the bona fide error
defense did not apply to legal errors, leaving it to Congress to
address any policy concerns.84
The dissent, however, opined that the Jerman decision would
create impractical real-world scenarios for attorney debt collectors,
conflict with attorneys’ ethical duties, and entrench the most
troubling aspects of our legal system.85 Often a plaintiff does not seek
a trial verdict and “will be just as happy with a settlement, as will his
or her attorney (who will receive fees regardless).”86 A defendant
may also prefer a quick settlement to the burdens of a protracted trial
with high litigation costs and greater potential liability, particularly
in class actions.87 Indeed, the dissent found that the present case
precisely illustrated this point.88
The dissent stated that Congress enacted the bona fide error
defense precisely because it too was troubled by this dynamic.89 That
trial courts have discretion to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees—
and can award fees to a defendant if a lawsuit is brought in bad
faith—provides no bulwark against these concerns.90 The dissent
explained that a fee award is not, in practice, rigorously adjusted
based on a court’s assessment of a suit’s utility.91 Moreover, if a
plaintiff obtains a favorable judgment or settlement, “then by
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1624.
84. Id. (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295 (1995)).
85. Id. at 1628–29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1631.
87. Id.
88. Id. (referring to Jerman filing suit despite suffering no injuries and, after merits-related
discovery, offering to settle the case for $22,500); see supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
89. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1631–32.
91. Id. at 1632.

1104

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1091

definition the suit will not have been brought in bad faith.”92 Thus, a
potential fee award is highly unlikely and will not deter plaintiffs
from alleging ostensibly frivolous FDCPA claims.
Next, the dissent feared that the Jerman decision would subject
attorneys to liability when they had done nothing wrong, indeed,
“even when they have acted in accordance with their professional
responsibilities.”93 The instant case offered proof of such an
outcome, as Carlisle had acted reasonably, had acted in good faith,
and had not injured Jerman.94 This problem is further underscored
because, “even where a particular practice is compelled by existing
precedent, the attorney may be sued if that precedent is later
overturned.”95 This is so, the dissent reasoned, because the majority
deemed the conduct actionable as an “intentional ‘violation.’”96 For
these reasons, the dissent concluded that the majority opinion would
create an unworkable reality for attorney debt collectors.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court’s Reading of the FDCPA’s Text and Legislative
History Places Too Little Weight in Some Areas and Too Much in
Others
The majority inferred from its construction of the statutory text
and the history of the bona fide error provision that appears in both
the FDCPA and TILA that Congress did not intend the defense to
apply to mistakes of law. This conclusion seems improper. While
three circuit courts had held, during the nine-year period between
TILA’s enactment and the FDCPA’s passage, that TILA’s bona fide
error provision applied only to clerical errors,97 that is hardly
sufficient to conclude that the judicial interpretation of the language
of this provision was well settled.98 In fact, the Sixth and Tenth
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 1634–35.
94. Id. at 1635.
95. Id. at 1634.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1616 & n.10 (majority opinion); see supra text accompanying notes 70–74.
98. Id. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It seems to
me unreasonable, however, to assume that, when Congress has a bill before it that contains
language used in an earlier statute, it is aware of, and approves as correct, a mere three Court of
Appeals decisions interpreting that earlier statute over the previous nine years.”).
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Circuits recently issued decisions conflicting with those of the three
prior circuit courts.99 The majority essentially acknowledged this
fact, yet stated that “there is [also] no reason to suppose that
Congress disagreed with those [prior] interpretations [of the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits] when it enacted the FDCPA.”100
Perhaps the majority’s supposition is correct. However, this analysis
tells us nothing about whether Congress intended to so limit the
scope of the bona fide error defense as applied to an attorney’s
mistake of law because, when originally enacted, the FDCPA
exempted attorneys from liability altogether.101 In creating the
FDCPA, Congress simply did not consider the ramifications of
failing to give attorney debt collectors a bona fide error defense for
technical legal errors.
Although undervalued by the Court, the amendments to the
FDCPA represent another crucial factor in the analysis. While Heintz
held that the 1986 Amendment brought litigating attorneys within the
Act’s scope,102 Congress did not expressly state that the bona fide
error exception excluded mistakes of law despite the eight
amendments it has made (thus far) to the FDCPA.103 Although it
seems difficult to infer from Congress’s silence that it intended this
exception to apply to legal errors, Congress has, on the other hand,
expressly stated that mistakes of law are inapposite in TILA.104 It is
not surprising that a similar statement is absent from the FDCPA
given its goals of curbing unfair debt-collection practices and
ensuring that honest debt collectors are not competitively
disadvantaged. Bona fide legal mistakes, particularly technical
mistakes causing no damage, cannot be called “unfair debt collection
practices,”105 nor do debt collectors “gain a competitive advantage by
making good-faith legal errors any more than by making good-faith
factual errors.”106 The absence of similar language in TILA and the
99. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 538 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir.
2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1605 (2010); Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1122–24 (10th Cir.
2002).
100. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1616.
101. See Stueben, supra note 4, at 3119–20.
102. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995).
103. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1617, 1624 n.22.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (2006).
105. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1632 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1633.
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FDCPA suggests that Congress recognizes this dynamic. The
attorney exemption in the original FDCPA resolved any conflict that
might have otherwise existed between an attorney’s duty to a client
and that attorney’s compliance with the FDCPA. The order of events
here means one can infer nearly nothing from this legislative history.
Moreover, as the dissent points out, the plain language of
§ 1692k(c) provides a bona fide error defense specifically for
unintentional “violations,” rather than unintentional “conduct.”107
This language, combined with a Senate Committee Report stating
that the bona fide error provision also applies “with regard to the
[A]ct’s coverage,” makes the Court’s decision even more peculiar.108
A violation regarding the FDCPA’s coverage or scope seems to be
Congress’s way of including mistakes of law as bona fide errors.109
This reading should be particularly favored given that the other
possible exception under the FDCPA—seeking an advisory opinion
from the FTC and acting in reliance upon it—has proven impractical,
as the FTC has issued only four opinions in response to seven
requests in the decade preceding Jerman, with a typical response
time of three to four months.110 In practice, if the FTC even chooses
to respond to an attorney’s request, a three- to four-month delay
before an attorney can advise a client as to how to act makes the
process essentially unusable.
The majority, however, seemed to ignore the FTC’s failures in
this area, focusing instead on the “role Congress evidently
contemplated for the FTC in resolving ambiguities in the Act.”111
107. Id. at 1629; see 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
108. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1619 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-382, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1700); id. at 1627 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“The Court claims that a mistake about ‘the [A]ct’s coverage’ in this passage might
refer to factual mistakes . . . . The Court’s explanation seems to me inadequate. No lawyer—
indeed, no one speaking accurately—would equate a mistake regarding the Act’s coverage with a
mistake regarding whether a particular fact situation falls within the Act’s coverage.”).
109. That the FDCPA did not originally apply to attorneys does not undermine this argument,
since non-attorneys may also make legal errors. Non-attorneys “sometimes receive and rely upon
erroneous legal advice from attorneys. Indeed, if anyone could satisfy the defense’s requirement
of maintaining ‘procedures reasonably adapted to avoid’ a legal error, it would be a non-attorney
[who directs] . . . all legal questions to his attorney.” Id. at 1628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
110. See id. at 1621, 1624 (majority opinion) (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING
CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 67 (2009)); id. at 1635 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
111. Id. at 1615 (majority opinion).
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Since § 1692k(e) exempts acts done or omitted in conformity with
any advisory opinion of the FTC, the majority reasoned that debt
collectors “would rarely need to consult the FTC if [the bona fide
error defense] . . . offer[ed] immunity for good-faith reliance on
advice from private counsel.”112 However, this analysis ignores the
possibility that Congress intended to include two separate
alternatives to immunity, and that these alternatives may overlap. If,
for example, the FTC’s response is lacking or is unreasonably
delayed through no fault of the debt collector, it seems sensible for
Congress to provide that debt collector with another road to
immunity. In this sense, the dissent’s proposed statutory scheme113
seems more reasonable.
B. The Potentially Untenable
Consequences of the Majority’s Decision
The FDCPA’s difficult and imprecise text and legislative history
do not unequivocally support one interpretation of the Act.
Nevertheless, the potential disruption to an attorney’s ethical duties
may ultimately carry the day. Imagine a scenario in which an
attorney collecting an alleged debt for a client follows the current
legal precedent and interpretation of one of the FDCPA’s many
technical provisions. Shortly thereafter, this precedent is overturned.
The consumer allegedly owing the debt then files an FDCPA-based
lawsuit against the attorney for violating a technical aspect of the
FDCPA. Under the Jerman decision, the attorney cannot rely on the
FDCPA’s bona fide error provision to excuse this legal error. While
actual damages may be small or nonexistent, the potentially high cost
of defending such a suit gives attorney-defendants great incentive to
settle the matter. This is true particularly because a trier of fact may
nevertheless award statutory damages and may in fact be required to
award the plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.114 Jerman
teaches that this scenario is quite possible, as Jerman herself brought
an FDCPA-based lawsuit “despite suffering no harm,” and quickly
sought to settle her case for $22,500.115

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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This very real threat presents attorneys with a host of conflicts.
While an attorney “must be given some latitude to zealously
advocate for his or her client,”116 under the majority’s reading of the
FDCPA, the Act holds attorneys liable for technical legal errors that
do not truly touch on the abusive practices that Congress designed
the Act to prevent. Thus, attorneys may be found liable under the Act
for technical legal errors despite having acted in good faith.
Although the majority noted that other constraints on judicial
advocacy exist, these constraints assume that an attorney acted not in
good faith but with an improper purpose.117 This further constraint on
judicial advocacy means that an attorney cannot foreclose the
possibility of a seemingly frivolous, but sanctioned, lawsuit without
taking a debtor-friendly approach to a given situation presented by a
debt-collecting client.
The majority discounted such consequences of its holding by
noting that a trial court has discretion to determine statutory damages
and that only “reasonable” attorney’s fees are awarded under the
FDPCA.118 However, any suit that is technically successful, even one
that nets a plaintiff next to nothing in damages, requires an award of
costs and reasonable fees.119 Moreover, in the Ninth Circuit (as in
other jurisdictions), a district court must calculate attorney’s fees
under the lodestar method.120 The lodestar figure is calculated by
multiplying the reasonable hourly rate of the prevailing party’s
attorney by the number of hours the attorney reasonably expended on
the litigation.121 This figure is considered presumptively reasonable
and may only be adjusted upward or downward in rare cases.122 This
system of calculating fees presents an attorney-defendant with an
116. People v. Kalnoki, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827, 829 (Super. Ct. 1992).
117. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1622.
118. Id. at 1620–21.
119. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
120. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ferland v.
Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)); see Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
121. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 978 (quoting Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1149 n.4).
122. Id. at 982 (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1402 (9th Cir. 1992)); see
Kristin A.C. Olin, Comment, Unreasonable Calculations of “Reasonable” Fees: Perdue v.
Kenny A. ex rel. Winn and the Supreme Court’s Ongoing Struggle with 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 44
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1113, 1117–24 (2010) (discussing the facts, reasoning, limitations on lodestar
adjustment, and weaknesses in the holding of Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662
(2010), the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent opinion addressing lodestar enhancement).
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even greater risk of liability if he or she refuses to settle a sanctioned
yet frivolous lawsuit, particularly because a trial court’s attorney’s
fee award under § 1692k is reviewed on appeal under a lenient
abuse-of-discretion standard.123
Although the majority appeared to assume otherwise,124 at least
in counteracting the dissent, a mistake-of-law defense need not apply
to all third-party debt collectors (such as non-attorneys) or absolve
all legal errors. Limiting the defense to only technical legal errors
and only to attorneys (or third-party debt collectors who act pursuant
to an attorney’s advice) is sufficient to counteract the potential
consequences of the majority’s decision. Such a careful rewriting of
the Act is an assignment best left to Congress but seems to align
more properly with the goals stated in the FDCPA. This limited
exception would allow attorneys to advocate for their clients
appropriately while avoiding the evisceration of the FDCPA that
would occur if all debt collectors could claim a bona fide mistake-oflaw defense.
In so limiting the scope of the defense, and in remembering that
a defendant must also maintain procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid such errors,125 the FDCPA’s practical effect will better coincide
with Congress’s objectives. It will also coincide with the Heintz
Court’s declaration that its interpretation of the FDCPA (as applied
to attorneys) will not produce absurd results.126 While it remains to be
seen whether the Jerman decision will produce absurd results or
whether the FTC will continue to reluctantly issue advisory opinions,
Congress would be wise to so amend the FDCPA should empirical
evidence point in either of these directions.
V. PROPOSAL
As Justice Kennedy eloquently stated, “[w]hen statutory
provisions have not yet been interpreted in a definitive way,
principled advocacy is to be prized, not punished.”127 When a reading
123. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1621 n.16; see also Camacho, 523 F.3d at 977–78 (“If we
conclude that the district court applied the proper legal principles and did not clearly err in any
factual determination, then we review the award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse of discretion.”
(quoting Ferland, 244 F.3d at 1148)).
124. See Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1623.
125. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (2006).
126. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295–98 (1995).
127. Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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of federal law “would seriously undermine the attorney-client
relationship,” the law should be “narrowly construed.”128 Jerman
opens the door precisely to this danger. As such, the situation must
be monitored carefully, and if the danger is borne out empirically,
Congress must resolve it by amending the FDCPA before the conflict
proves irreconcilable.
First, Congress must monitor whether the FTC amends its
practice of failing to issue advisory opinions to some requests and
responding too late to others. While the seven requests mentioned
above present quite a small sample size, an average delay of three to
four months is impractical for attorney debt collectors.129 If, as
Justice Breyer assumed,130 the FTC increases the number of advisory
opinions it issues and reduces delays, the need to include legal errors
within the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense will be substantially
lessened.
Second, because Jerman interprets the FDCPA to subject
attorneys to personal liability for technical legal errors under the Act,
Congress must monitor whether the foundation of zealous advocacy
on which our legal system relies is overtly undermined. It can do so
through traditional methods (organizing subcommittees dedicated to
such observation, polling constituents, or speaking to experts on the
matter) or by monitoring the courts (conducting empirical studies on
the rise of related FDCPA-based lawsuits or the rate at which
attorneys more often face civil suits or state bar charges for relevant
ethical violations).
If Congress finds a mounting disruption to our system of zealous
advocacy, it would be wise to include legal errors within the
FDCPA’s bona fide error defense. Limiting this expanded defense to
only attorney debt collectors or debt collectors acting pursuant to an
attorney’s advice and only to technical legal errors (rather than all
legal errors), will likely effectuate Congress’s stated goals in
enacting the FDCPA while minimizing undesired and negative
consequences to our legal system. On the whole, non-attorneys will
also benefit greatly from such a change as their attorneys will better

128. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1338 n.5
(2010).
129. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 80.
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be able to represent their interests without fear of personal or
professional conflict.
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